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Constituent Power and Constituent Authority
MIKOLAJ BARCZENTEWICZ
My aim in this Paper is to analyze Professor Richard Kay’s notion of
‘constituent authority’ within H. L. A. Hart’s model of foundations of legal
systems. I thus elucidate the relationship between constituent power, Kay’s
constituent authority, and Hartian rules of recognition. I begin by distinguishing
two understandings of constituent power: de facto and de jure. In general,
constituent power is a power to bring about constitutional change that is not a
legal power and is not constituted by (grounded in) any legal power. On the first
view, constituent power is a factual capacity (e.g. a kind of social “power”) to
bring about constitutional change. On the second view, constituent power is a
normative (e.g. moral) power to bring about constitutional change. I stress that
anyone aiming to apply a normative conception of constituent power needs to
grapple with the difficult questions in moral and political philosophy entailed by
the necessity of choosing a normative framework.
I then introduce Professor Kay’s notion of “constituent authority,” which—
unlike that of constituent power—can account for change of reasons that people
have for acceptance of the authority of a constitution adopted at some point in the
past. Elucidating Kay’s constituent authority, I argue that it is best understood as
a kind of a normative social practice of acceptance of the authority of the makers
of (1) an existing constitution or (2) a potential future constitution.
The remaining key definitional question about both constituent powers and
constituent authority is: what kind of constitutional change results from an
exercise of either kind of a power? Can constituent power (authority) bring about
any constitutional change, or is there some definitional restriction? Without giving
a definite answer, I show various possible answers to this dilemma. I also argue
that one potentially attractive possibility, tying the definition of constituent power
or constituent authority to changes of rules of recognition, should be rejected. It
should be rejected because it leads to a concept which is likely to be both
under- and overinclusive.
Finally, I discuss the possibility of lawful exercises of constituent power (and
constituent authority). As I argue, it can even be that a constitutional change
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through a change of the rule of recognition is both, in a sense, a result of an
exercise of a constituent power, and entirely lawful.
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Constituent Power and Constituent Authority
MIKOLAJ BARCZENTEWICZ *
INTRODUCTION
In this Paper, written for the symposium celebrating the scholarship of
Professor Richard Kay, I will focus on Professor Kay’s contribution to the
debate on the roles of power and authority in constitutional change. I share
Professor Kay’s perspective on the relationship between constitutional law
and legal theory (general jurisprudence):
If by legal theory we mean considered reflection on the
nature and sources of law, no field of law more insistently
engages questions of legal theory than constitutional law.
Constitutional law regularly involves the application of rules
that are fundamental in the sense that they control and
authorize other law but are, themselves, neither controlled
nor authorized by any other law. The interpretation and
elaboration of those rules necessarily requires attention to the
very basis of a legal system, to the stuff that makes law law.1
Thinking about those vexed questions, I also share his preference to
employ H. L. A. Hart’s model of foundations of legal systems as a
framework.2 My specific aim in this paper is to analyze Professor Kay’s
notion of “constituent authority” within the Hartian model of foundations
of legal systems. I thus elucidate the relationship between constituent
power, Kay’s constituent authority, and Hartian rules of recognition.
I begin, in Section 2, by distinguishing two understandings of
constituent power: de facto and de jure. In general, constituent power is a
power to bring about constitutional change that is not a legal power and is
not constituted by (grounded in) any legal power. On the first view,
constituent power is a factual capacity (e.g. a kind of social “power”) to
bring about constitutional change. On the second view, constituent power
is a normative (e.g. moral) power to bring about constitutional change. I
stress that anyone aiming to apply a normative conception of constituent
*
Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Public Law and Legal Theory, University of Surrey
School of Law. Contact information: www.barczentewicz.com.
1
Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 445, 445
(1991).
2
See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3rd ed. 2012) (fully discussing Hart’s
framework).
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power needs to grapple with the difficult questions in moral and political
philosophy entailed by the necessity of choosing a normative framework.
In Section 3, I introduce Professor Kay’s notion of “constituent
authority,” which—unlike that of constituent power—can account for
change of reasons that people have for acceptance of the authority of a
constitution adopted at some point in the past. Elucidating Kay’s
constituent authority, I argue that it is best understood as a kind of a
normative social practice of acceptance of the authority of the makers of
(1) an existing constitution or (2) a potential future constitution.
The remaining key definitional question about both constituent powers
and constituent authority is: what kind of constitutional change results
from an exercise of either kind of a power? Can constituent power
(authority) bring about any constitutional change, or is there some
definitional restriction? Without giving a definite answer, in Section 4, I
show various possible answers to this dilemma. I also argue that one
potentially attractive possibility, tying the definition of constituent power
or constituent authority to changes of rules of recognition, should be
rejected. It should be rejected because it leads to a concept which is likely
to be both under- and overinclusive.
Finally, in Section 5, I discuss the possibility of lawful exercises of
constituent power (and constituent authority). As I argue, it can even be
that a constitutional change through a change of the rule of recognition is
both, in a sense, a result of an exercise of a constituent power, and entirely
lawful.
I. CONSTITUENT POWER: DE JURE AND DE FACTO
I begin with the most general, or fundamental, “power” of
constitutional change, the famous pouvoir constituant. “Primary
constituent power,” as used by Yaniv Roznai, means a specific kind of a
power to make a new constitution or to alter the current one.3 Constituent
power is said to be unlimited “at least in the sense that it is not bound by
previous constitutional rules and procedures,”4 and to be possessed only by
“the people.”5
Constituent power is not simply a power of constitutional change,
because that can plausibly be provided for under pre-existing constitutional
3
YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS OF
AMENDMENT POWERS 122 (2017).
4
Id. at 109.
5
Id. at 122. See also ANDREW ARATO, THE ADVENTURES OF THE CONSTITUENT POWER: BEYOND
REVOLUTIONS? 31 (2017) (discussing preliminary definitions of sovereign constitutionalism); Mikolaj
Barczentewicz & Alice Schneider, Andrew Arato, The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond
Revolutions?, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 219, 224 (2019) (commenting on Arato’s central thesis of separating
revolution from sovereign constitution making).
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rules, as Roznai admits. Hence, it must be a kind of power that cannot be
limited by any pre-existing rules, even when such rules purport to regulate
replacement of the current constitution. To put it in other words, it must be
a power that cannot by conferred by a pre-existing constitutional (legal or
non-legal) rule, or at least by a rule that belongs to the constitutional order
being changed (replaced).
Unlike constituent power, amendment power (or constituted power) is
a kind of legal power. Amendment power is a legal power to change the
constitution. Importantly, as I use the term, amendment powers are not
only powers to change the text of a codified constitution. Amendment
powers are also powers to change any constitutional rule, which may in
some legal systems include, for instance, statutory rules of election law and
so on. In Hartian terms, amendment powers are conferred by rules of
change, i.e. legal rules that confer legal powers to change the law.7 Some
think that (lawful) constitutional change takes place only if it is a result of
an exercise of a pre-existing amendment power.8 I dispute this in my other
work.9
Back to constituent power: what kind of a power is it? There are two
main possibilities. First, it could be a brute, de facto, capacity to bring
about constitutional change.10 For example, a conquering army may be
able to exercise such a capacity by coercing the conquered society. An
exercise of such a constituent power may, but of course need not, be
entirely illegitimate from every moral perspective. It may be difficult to
identify in advance whether anyone possesses a de facto constituent power.
We are more likely to know that only after the fact, when we can observe
that someone has indeed succeeded in bringing about constitutional
change. That said, even after the fact it may be controversial to whom
should agency (authorship) be attributed.11
Second, it could be a normative (e.g. moral), de jure power to make
constitutional change. If someone possesses a constituent power in the
normative sense, it means that, if they exercise that power, then through
that exercise they change what other people ought (in the relevant sense of
‘ought’) to accept as their constitution. The power of a second kind can
6

ROZNAI, supra note 3, at 122.
Mikolaj Barczentewicz, Constitutional Change and the Rule of Recognition 171–73 (2019)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author).
8
Id. at 216–26.
9
Id.
10
Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 719 (“[T]he constituent power
is often described in terms of raw force, physical, psychological and emotional.”).
11
See Mikolaj Barczentewicz, Who Made the United States Constitution? 3–4 (Aug. 8, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323497 (arguing that
the thirteen state groups made the Constitution); Mikolaj Barczentewicz, I Am Not Your (Founding)
Father, in FOUNDING MOMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONALISM 73, 74 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2019).
7
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only exist in reference to some notion of normativity, of what ought to be
done. There are many possible understandings of normativity, including,
for example, the social (conventional) sense (what the given society at a
given time considers to be due, obligatory, etc.). Another possibility is
some kind of “brooding omnipresence in the sky,”12 e.g., a pre-modern
natural law conception of normativity.
However, by definition, one kind of normativity is never (directly)
determinative of existence and shape of constituent powers: legal
normativity. Constituent powers are not created by law and cannot be
limited by law. This is not to deny that there may be relationships between
the law and, for example, the social sense of morality. But the point is that
if law has any effect on existence and limits of constituent powers, such
effect is mediated by the relevant kind of normativity.
In most circumstances, anyone discussing constituent powers in any
practical context should specify which kind of normativity they adopt.
Otherwise, any such discussion risks being radically indeterminate in a key
dimension and thus of little practical relevance. This is so because there
may be a world of difference between, e.g., some author’s favored
conception of morality and the social morality of the community of which
he or she is writing. If the author doesn’t specify which kind of normativity
defines his or her understanding of constituent power, then we may be
learning very little about what this notion of constituent power entails. Of
course, explicit reference to some kind of normativity opens any author to
criticism regarding that very choice, but this is a feature, not a bug. It
rightly focuses our attention on the fact that questions of constituent power
(other than in a de facto sense) necessarily engage questions of moral and
political philosophy and that rigorous treatment of the former requires
rigorous engagement with the latter.
It seems to me that in today’s literature, as exemplified by Roznai’s
work, the latter, normative conception of constituent power tends to be
widely accepted.13
II. KAY’S “CONSTITUENT AUTHORITY”
In principle, whether some historical event involved an exercise of a
constituent power is settled at the time the event took place. Nothing that
happens afterwards can change whether someone (or some group of
people) had a constituent power at that time and whether they validly

12
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Kay,
Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 716 (explaining why Justice Holmes’s characterization is an
“artifact”).
13
ROZNAI, supra note 3, at 109, 122.
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exercised that power then and there. This is certainly true for de jure
constituent powers, but in a sense also for de facto constituent powers.14
However, both in law and in broader reflection about constitutional
change we sometimes observe that ex post attributions of constitutionmaking power (or authority) are more fluid than that. It may be that several
decades after some constitutional change took place, the polity in question
comes to accept that the change was made by some authority which, from a
historical perspective, was not really an authority of the relevant kind at
that time (i.e. did not have constituent power). Take, for example, a
constitution made by a monarch (let’s stipulate that he had constituent
power in the relevant sense), but where a century later the polity comes to
accept that the constitution was really authoritatively made by “the people”
(let’s stipulate that the people clearly did not have constituent power in the
relevant sense at the time the constitution was made). In other words,
polities may adopt narratives about authorities behind past acts of
constitution-making, which in one sense are fictional.15 Such narratives are
fictional from the perspective of the normative reality at the time of the
historical change.
Professor Kay in his Constituent Authority has shown how important
are such ex post stories about past authority.16 They are key for continued
existence (effectiveness) of constitutions created in the past.17 In fact, the
historical truth of who really possessed and exercised the constituent power
(of some kind) to make our constitution is at most only indirectly relevant
to the currently much more practically important fact that we accept this
constitution today. It is only relevant to the extent our current social
practice of acceptance of that constitution is somehow related to this
historical truth. But any such relationship is contingent and could
conceivably not exist at all (e.g. due to a kind of collective amnesia or due
to a conscious decision to reject some aspects of the past).
14
It is just that for de facto constituent powers the relevant event of the exercise of the power is
likely to be extended in time, because it is an element of a definition of a de facto power that its
exercise is successful and a successful constitutional change is one that is effective at least for some
time. Hence, extension of any exercise of a de facto power depends on the length of that necessary
period of effectiveness. However, on any workable view this definitional requirement must be limited
(otherwise we would never know whether some constitutional change was brought about by an exercise
of a de facto constituent power, because it could be that even though effective today it will cease to be
effective at some uncertain later date). The key point here is that when this period ends, it becomes
settled that an exercise of a de facto constituent power took place—nothing that happens after can
change that.
15
Barczentewicz, Who Made the United States Constitution?, supra note 11, at 43–45;
Barczentewicz, I Am Not Your (Founding) Father, supra note 11, at 75–82.
16
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 752–55.
17
Kay limited his discussion to “constitution in the modern sense, an identifiable text or set of
texts containing rules at the highest level of the formal legal hierarchy.” Id. at 715. Thus, Kay excluded
the U.K. constitution from his project. Id.
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To capture the phenomenon of reasons for current acceptance of a
constitution, Kay introduced his concept of “constituent authority” to refer
to “the things that a given people in a given time and place understand as
competent to make a binding constitution.”18
Now, this formulation may suggest that one people at one time accepts
one constituent authority. But I don’t think that this is the best
understanding of that concept precisely due to the possibility of changing
views on past authority. I think that Kay implicitly accepts (and in any case
should accept) that any given people could, at the same time, have one
view of constituent authority behind their current constitution and a
different view of constituent authority required to replace this
constitution.19 For example, the people of the U.S. today could accept that
the current constituent authority for future radical constitutional change is
with “the people,” while accepting that the constituent authority behind the
U.S. Constitution was a group of “extraordinarily gifted statesmen.”20 And
it could be that the latter view of constituent authority is a kind of a fiction
because it was false at the time the Constitution was made.
To the extent constituent authority is concerned with power to bring
about future constitutional change, it is I think synonymous with
constituent power. Kay’s own description created an interesting ambiguity
as to whether it is a kind of de facto or de jure constituent power. On one
hand, he has written:
I refer to the observed quality in a person or persons that
enables them to produce an effective positive law
constitution. I do not intend to consider what, in light of one
or another universal political morality, might be argued
properly to invest a person or persons with that capacity. In
this essay, I am interested in practical authority, the kind that
actually does produce a constitution that is regarded as
binding for an extended period in the population governed by
the legal system that the constitution purports to control.21
This seems to suggest that he has in mind a kind of a de facto power.
However, he likened constituent authority to H. L. A. Hart’s rules of
recognition, which I think is both telling and helpful.22 Kay also has
written that:
18
Id. at 716. For other uses of “constituent authority,” see JOHN FINNIS, Introduction to
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS VOLUME IV 1, 12 (2011); ROZNAI, supra note 3, at 118.
19
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 749.
20
Id. at 749 n.183.
21
Id. at 720 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
22
Id. at 721 (Kay likens constituent authority to H. L. A. Hart’s conception of the rule of
recognition—that it exists “only as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts,
officials, and private persons.”).
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In the case of a constitution, it will be essential that there
exists an explicit or implicit determination by some
significant part of the population that the makers of the
constitution are or were an appropriate source of
constitutional rules.23
And that:
[constituent authority] is a certain kind of fact, one that
includes the collective critical judgments of some number of
individuals in certain times and places. It is this continuing
normative attitude that distinguishes constituent authority
from simple constituent power.24
It follows that constituent authority is, in a way, a kind of a normative
social practice of acceptance: 25
(1) for an existing constitution: that the current constitution
is legitimate due to being made by some specific person
or group (with or without some additional features or
procedural conditions);
(2) for future constitutions: that a (future) constitution made
by some specific person or group (with or without some
additional features or procedural conditions) will be
legitimate.
Of course, it may very well be in some society at some time that (1)
and (2) are the same. I distinguish them here only because there is a
possibility (not a necessity) of divergence.
The second, future-oriented, mode of constituent authority is identical
with de jure constituent power where normativity is understood as social
normativity. It is the first, past-oriented, mode that is performing a distinct
job from the concept of constituent power (de jure or de facto) and as such
is a very important notion to include in our thinking about constitutional
change and constitutional legitimacy.26
23

Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
25
On normative social practices of acceptance (especially of rules of recognition), see Adam
Perry, The Internal Aspect of Social Rules, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2015) and Mikolaj
Barczentewicz, The Illuminati Problem and Rules of Recognition, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 500
(2018).
26
Usefulness of such a past-oriented concept of constituent authority can be also illustrated by
analogy with Joseph Raz’s argument regarding the role of legal powers in the foundation of the state of
Israel. Raz argued that the existence of legal powers to make even the most basic constitutional laws
may be recognised ex post. Whenever such ex post recognition is alleged, it is important to pay
attention to the time-perspective from which such ascriptions of legal powers to past events are made.
See Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
24
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Professor Kay rightly stressed that “the identification of constituent
authority is an inherently time-bound phenomenon.”27 This is also true of
constituent power as I argued earlier. For both constituent power and
constituent authority we must be very clear about the time-perspective
from which we look at the phenomena. There can only be constituent
power at time t in a community c, or constituent authority at time t in a
community c—if those terms are not indexed to specific times and
communities, they are without practical relevance.
III. WHAT KIND OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE RESULTS FROM
CONSTITUENT POWER?
I will now turn to the key remaining aspect of the concept of a
constituent power (and of constituent authority), namely: is it a power to
bring about any constitutional change or only some specific kinds of
constitutional change? There is no doubt that constituent power is a power
to make a new constitution, especially in the sense of enactment of a new
codified constitutional text which is a wholesale replacement of the
previous one. This is true about Professor Kay’s constituent authority as
well.28 But can a constituent power be exercised to bring about something
short of making a new constitution in this sense? Kay seems to deny such a
possibility, whereas authors like Roznai and Loughlin lean the other way.29
I will not attempt to give a detailed answer to the question just posed. I
do have significant sympathy to a view that constituent power is defined
more by who possesses it and, perhaps, the basic shape of a procedure in
which it should be exercised (e.g. conventions? referendums?). In other
words, I don’t think that constituent power is limited in what sort of
constitutional change it can achieve. I’m willing to accept that even a
seemingly small constitutional change (significantly short of constitutional
replacement) could also be brought about by constituent power.
If a constitutional change in question is not a wholesale replacement,
then how would we know that a constituent power had been exercised at
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 59, 84–85 (1972) (arguing “that a satisfactory
analysis of voluntary obligations must be in terms of normative powers”). Just like some ex post
narratives about constituent power, Razian ex post-recognised legal powers are, I believe, only legal
powers as a matter of legal fiction. Such recognition does not change the fact that at the time the
constitution changed, this happened not due to an exercise of a legal power. Barczentewicz,
Constitutional Change and the Rule of Recognition, supra note 7.
27
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 716, 748–49.
28
Id. at 732 (according to Kay, constituent authority is exercised when a constitution’s identity is
destroyed, thus establishing a new constitution).
29
Id. at 732; see Martin Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, 13 EUROPEAN J. POL.
THEORY 218, 232 (2014) (arguing that constituent power “continues to function within an established
regime”); see also ROZNAI, supra note 3, at 121–22 (“[T]he constitution-making process is often
exercised in continuity with historic or existing laws or in accordance with pre-determined rules . . . .
[C]onstituent power is never purely original.” (footnote omitted)).
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all? One possible strategy for answering this question would be to study
who, according to what the people broadly accepted at the time of change,
would have had the constituent power to replace the constitution entirely
(and in what procedure).30 In other words, to study the normative social
practice of acceptance that I discussed in the previous section.31
An auxiliary method that may sometimes be available is to look at
whether the constitutional change in question was lawful.32 If it was
unlawful and yet it was readily accepted as legitimate, this may suggest
that it was a result of an exercise of a constituent power. This method is not
universally applicable because it may very well be that exercises of
constituent power will happen to be lawful.33
IV. NECESSITY OF A CHANGE OF THE RULE OF RECOGNITION?
Professor Kay has written: “When we are able to say that the
underlying sanction for all lawmaking (the rule of recognition) has
successfully changed, it is proper to say that the agent of that change has
exercised constituent authority.”34
This could be understood in at least two alternative ways. First, that
whenever a constitutional change that involves a change of the rule of
recognition is a result of someone’s agency, the agent exercised a
constituent authority. Second, that exercises of constituent power take
place only if they lead to a change of the rule of recognition (this may
seem to be in line with the idea that constituent authority is for making new
constitutions35). The first view does not exclude the possibility of an
exercise of a constituent authority that does not result in a change of the
rule of recognition; the second view entails such exclusion.
Analogously, we can pose two hypotheses regarding constituent
power:

30
See Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 756 (arguing that the force of the constitution
depends on acceptance. According to Kay, acceptance is comprised of “some minimum part of the
relevant population . . . find[ing] the constitution’s substantive rules satisfactory” and the population’s
“regard [for] the constitutional rules as having issued from a legitimate source.”).
31
See supra Section II (describing that Kay’s concept of constituent authority refers to the
understanding of the people at a certain time and place which makes a binding constitution).
32
See Mattias Kumm, Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism, and Post-Positivist
Law, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 697, 701 (2016) (noting that politics outside of laws is “either an occasion
for constituent power . . . or simply illegal”).
33
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 731.
34
Id. at 732.
35
See Oran Doyle, Populist Constitutionalism and Constituent Power, 20 GERMAN L.J. 161, 162
(2019) (discussing that constituent power can explain how new constitutions can be created without
existing legal authority).
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(1) every change of the rule of recognition which is a result
of someone’s agency is a result of an exercise of a
constituent power;
(2) every effective exercise of a constituent power
necessarily results in a change of the rule of recognition.
My view is that (1) and (2) are mistaken, both for constituent powers
and for Kay’s constituent authority. It is only the case that some exercises
of constituent power or constituent authority result in changes of the rule of
recognition and that some changes of the rule of recognition that are the
result of someone’s agency are a result of an exercise of a constituent
power or constituent authority.
Also, we have to be very careful when talking about any relationships
between exercises of powers (or authority) and changes of social rules like
the rule of recognition. This is because, strictly speaking, social rules like
the rule of recognition cannot change directly by an exercise of a
normative power (or even de facto power).36 Loose talk about such
relationships often misrepresents the nature of how social rules change. I
will come back to this issue in the next section.
I see several reasons why, contrary to claims like (1) and (2), there are
no necessary connections between changes of rules of recognition on one
hand, and exercises of constituent power or constituent authority on the
other.
First, very significant constitutional change (including constitutional
replacement) may happen without any changes of the rule of recognition.
Consider a simplified scenario, in which it is universally accepted in some
society that the king’s enactments are the ultimate and supreme source of
law. Let’s stipulate that this does not change over time. We could then
have a first constitution enacted by the king, which is then replaced by a
later second constitution also enacted by the king (and introducing radical
changes compared to the first constitution). This constitutional replacement
took place without any change in the (ultimate) rule of recognition, which
was exactly the same at the moment the first constitution was adopted and
at the moment the second constitution was adopted. To give another
example, on one interpretation, Marbury v. Madison37 counts as precisely
36

See Barczentewicz, Constitutional Change and the Rule of Recognition, supra note 7, at 150–
57 (arguing that social rules cannot be changed directly by exercises of normative powers); JOSEPH
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 98–104 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing what it means to have a
normative power and distinguishing “normative” and “causal” ways of bringing about a normative
change).
37
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173–74 (1803) (holding that the Constitution vests the
whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court and inferior courts as Congress
chooses to establish); see also Douglas E. Edlin, The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law:
Departmentalism and Constitutional Development in the United States and the United Kingdom, 64
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that kind of constitutional change (changing the rule of recognition)
without an exercise of constituent power (or even a legal power of
constitutional amendment).
Second, no change of the (ultimate) rule of recognition is a
constitutional change at all if we understand a constitution as “an
identifiable text or set of texts containing rules at the highest level of the
formal legal hierarchy,” as did Professor Kay.38 To claim otherwise is to
commit a category error: the rule of recognition is a social rule, it is a
different sort of a thing, with different criteria (mode) of existence, than
any constitutional text.39 Hence, no change of the rule of recognition can be
the same as a change of the textual constitution. There may be other,
contingent relationships between such events: correlation, perhaps even
causation—but never identity.
Third, not every change of the (ultimate) rule of recognition is in any
way accompanied or associated with a change of a constitution understood
as a codified constitutional document. I do believe that every change in the
rule of recognition is a constitutional change, but I do so because I work
with a broad (“material”40) sense of a constitution, which includes
customary constitutional rules and non-legal constitutional rules. Some
changes of rules of recognition are not accompanied by any changes in
codified constitutions, so if someone adopts a narrower text-focused notion
of a constitution, then they must reject such changes as changes of the
constitution that they are interested in.
Fourth, not every change of the (ultimate) rule of recognition is a
significant constitutional change. If someone prefers to limit the notions of
constituent power or constituent authority only to some kinds of
constitutional change (significant change, constitutional replacement, etc.),
then it is clear that at least some changes of the rule of recognition may not
rise to that standard.
Fifth, some who arguably have a de facto capacity to cause a change of
the rule of recognition tend not to be seen as holders of constituent power.
Perhaps the best example is U.K. Parliament, which through enacting
statutes arguably could cause changes that, if effective, would amount to
changes of the U.K. rule of recognition (e.g. abolition of the common law
as a source of law). Despite that, U.K. Parliament tends not to be seen as a
holder of constituent power (rather, as an agent of the holder of that power:
the people).41
AM. J. COMP. L. 371, 384 (2016) (noting that Marbury interpreted the Constitution to give the Supreme
Court the power of judicial review, a concept that has since been well-established and accepted).
38
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 715.
39
Barczentewicz, Constitutional Change and the Rule of Recognition, supra note 7, at 114–21.
40
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 715.
41
UK Parliament, ELECTORAL COMM’N (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/
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Thus, neither the concept of constituent power nor that of constituent
authority should be defined by reference to any relationship with change of
the rule of recognition. It would be, I think, a mistake to define constituent
power (or constituent authority) as even a de facto capacity to change the
rule of recognition.42 For the reasons given above such a definition would
likely be underinclusive, overinclusive, or both.
It is, however, still very much meaningful to debate what kind of
constitutional change (by definition, necessarily) results from an exercise
of constituent power or constituent authority. Some may want to limit it to
a replacement of a codified constitutional document.43 Some may prefer a
notion of a significant change, which may fall short of full replacement.44
Others may require relevant constitutional change to happen unlawfully,
through violation of some legal (constitutional) rules.45 Finally, some—like
myself—may argue that both constituent power and constituent authority
can in principle be exercised to bring about any constitutional change.46
V. EXERCISES OF CONSTITUENT POWERS MAY BE LAWFUL47
By any view of constituent power, at least some exercises of
constituent powers can be unlawful. In fact, actions seen by some as
exercises of constituent power may be not only not recognized as legally
effective but be expressly legally prohibited, even criminalized.48 The
events around the Catalan unilateral declaration of independence provide a
vivid illustration of how a legal system (Spanish law) may see it as sedition
or even treason for a group of its subjects to purport to exercise constituent
power to secede.49 The success of Catalan independence, in the current
i-am-a/voter/types-elections/uk-parliament (stating that the UK Parliament represents the people).
42
There could not be a normative (de jure) power to change the rule of recognition for the reasons
explained in the next section. See infra Section V.
43
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 731–32 (noting that the convening of constituent
authority expresses the belief that the constitution requires a replacement).
44
See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3
(2018) (discussing that various techniques can be used to substantially change the constitution).
45
Kumm, supra note 32, at 701 (noting that action outside of established law can be classified as
constituent power or illegal).
46
Stephen M. Griffin, Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American
Constitutionalism 7, 15 (Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 06-12, 2006),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928493.
47
In this Section, whenever I mention constituent power it should be understood as including
constituent authority as well.
48
Kumm, supra note 32, at 701.
49
Zoran Oklopic, Constitutionalize This: Catalan Referendum as Political Surprise and
(Oct.
6,
2017),
Theoretical
Disruption,
I·CONNECT
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/10/constitutionalize-this-catalan-referendum-as-political-surpriseand-theoretical-disruption/; Milena Sterio, Catalonia: Is There a “Right” to Secession?, I·CONNECT
(Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/10/catalonia-is-there-a-right-to-secession/; Zoran
Oklopic, Drafting Independence: The Catalan Declaration of Sovereignty and the Question of the
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legal context, would involve the emergence of a new, independent political
community, with a new legal system and new ultimate rules of recognition.
However, unless we exclude this possibility by definition (and I don’t
think we should), there is no good reason to deny that it is possible for
exercises of constituent power and of constituent authority to be lawful.
For instance, if a constitution provides that it may be changed by a
referendum and if this kind of referendum is a genuine exercise of a
primary constituent power, then it could very well be that resulting
constitutional change will be constitutional and lawful, and it will also be a
genuine exercise of a constituent power.
Another, though more controversial, potential example is the famous
Article 146 of the German Basic Law.50 This constitutional provision
explicitly allows for replacement of the Basic Law with a constitution to be
adopted by the German people in a “free decision.”51 It is at least possible
that if such circumstances ever arise, the creation of a new German
constitution to replace the Basic Law will be rightly seen as a lawful
constitutional change, despite being a wholesale constitutional
replacement. And, of course, such an act of constitution-making will likely
be seen as a legitimate exercise of constituent power.
Several simple propositions follow from the definitional separation
between constituent power and the law. The lawfulness of any
constitutional change tells us nothing about whether that change was a
result of an exercise of a constituent power. However, unlawfulness also
tells us nothing. The law is simply irrelevant to our assessment of whether
a constituent power was exercised or not. What is, independently, an
exercise of a constituent power, may also happen to be lawful or unlawful.
An exercise of a constituent power may involve exercises of legal powers
of constitutional amendment, but whether it does is of no consequence on
whether it counts as a genuine exercise of the constituent power.
In my view, which I develop elsewhere, there are two ways in which
legal change (and thus any change in legal constitutional rules) may be
law-governed (lawful): it may be an exercise of a pre-existing legal power
to change the law or it may be merely recognized by a pre-existing rule of
recognition.52 Both grounds for lawfulness of legal change may apply to
constitutional changes which also, independently, happen to be genuine
Constituent Power of the People in Context, I·CONNECT (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/02/drafting-independence-the-catalan-declaration-of-sovereigntyand-the-question-of-the-constituent-power-of-the-people-in-context/.
50
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW],
translation
at
http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html. See also Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 726–27 (“It
is unclear how the constituent authority that [Article 146] recognizes fits with Article 79 stipulating the
process of constitutional amendment.”).
51
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 10, at 727.
52
Barczentewicz, Constitutional Change and the Rule of Recognition, supra note 7, at 226–31.
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exercises of constituent powers. This is true even of constitutional change
involving a change of ultimate rules of recognition.
There cannot be a legal power to change an ultimate rule of
recognition, because legal powers work without the intermediation that
would be required in the case of ultimate rules of recognition (e.g.
intermediation of an actual change in the social practice underlying an
ultimate rule of recognition).53 This is true of non-legal normative powers
as well—like de jure constituent power. However, some legal philosophers
insist that to deny the role of legal powers in a change of ultimate rules of
recognition is to fail to account properly for the internal perspective of
committed participants of legal practices.54 For example, Grant Lamond
has written:
In the operation of a legal system the rule of recognition is
treated as a binding law that may be subject to legal
alteration or clarification, but not to modification simply at
the will of officials.55
How could it then be that the rule of recognition cannot be changed
normatively through an exercise of a legal power and yet at the same time
is perceived as amenable “to legal alteration or clarification”?56 The
answer, I say, is that there can be legal abilities to change ultimate rules of
recognition, and the operation of such abilities can meaningfully be
characterized as “legal alteration.”57 For someone to have a standing ability
to change the law by doing X, it means that the legal officials are under a
legal duty to accept X as affecting valid legal change (a duty imposed by a
rule of recognition).
What explains the tendency to speak of some changes in ultimate rules
of recognition as “made” or “affected” by someone is the fact that the
actions of that someone are among the reasons that people have for
acceptance of the rule. A legal official might say—“I accepted that change
because parliament made it”—about a legal change that is, perhaps
unbeknownst to the official, a change in an ultimate rule of recognition.
53

An exercise of a law-making power must result in, or must end in, a change in the law. This is
not a trivial requirement. It excludes all the cases where an apparent law-maker merely influences
someone else who then changes the law or when she contributes to a bottom-up process of legal change
where no one can take the credit, legally speaking, for making the change. See id. at 150–57; see also
Lars Lindahl & David Reidhav, Legal Power: The Basic Definition, 30 RATIO JURIS 158, 177–78
(2017) (“[A]n agent’s practical ability to achieve legal result[] does not imply the agent’s legal power
to achieve [that result].”); Raz, supra note 26, at 80 (“I have a legal power only if it is my act which is
recognized by law as effecting a legal change.”).
54
Grant Lamond, Legal Sources, the Rule of Recognition, and Customary Law, 59 AM. J. JURIS.
25, 42 (2014).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Barczentewicz, Constitutional Change and the Rule of Recognition, supra note 7, at 226–31.
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The introduction of the notion of legal abilities to change the law allows
more fully to account for the role of reasons for acceptance of a legal
change. Relying merely on the standard concept of a legal power entails
treating statements like the one in the example just given as erroneous or
even incoherent.
Consider, for example, the issue of whether the U.K. Parliament has a
standing ability to change at least some ultimate rules of recognition of
U.K. law. As I defined it, if one has a standing ability to change the law
then the legal officials are under a legal duty to accept exercises of that
ability as affecting valid legal change. The officials legally should accept
the change. This, in my view, is sufficient to see that even a change of an
ultimate rule of recognition in response to an exercise of such an ability is
meaningfully lawful (law-governed).
In that sense, an official can have legal reasons to change what they
accept as the content of their duty of recognition of law. Arguments about
such reasons may be legal arguments. Thus, it does not follow that all
arguments “for or against” ultimate rules of recognition “are necessarily
extralegal.”58 Of course, I am not denying that it is also possible to make
extra-legal arguments about what should be the content of ultimate rules of
recognition.
Richard Albert claimed that codified constitutions can “attempt to
direct how constituent power can be validly exercised.”59 His example is
one of the procedures for constitutional change from Article V of the U.S.
Constitution, a method he sees as similar to the one used for adoption of
the Constitution itself (a proposal is to be made by a constitutional
convention, then ratified by three-quarters of the states in conventions).
Article V seems, straightforwardly, to ground both a legal power to change
the constitution (an amendment power) and a non-ultimate rule of
recognition imposing a duty to accept the changes as law.60 Could it be a
genuine exercise of a constituent power?
If someone accepts that constituent powers can only be exercised
unlawfully, then the question would be what sort of unlawfulness could be
at play. On one understanding, any violation of some legal duty would be
58
59

Contra Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 193 (1981).
Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22

(2018).
60
On the distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate rules of recognition, see Barczentewicz,
Constitutional Change and the Rule of Recognition, supra note 7, at 32–35; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 95 (2d ed. 2009) (“There must be in every
system some criteria of validity that, although legally binding, are not legally valid, hence they must be
set in the rule of recognition.”); JOHN GARDNER, LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH: ESSAYS ON LAW IN
GENERAL 101 n.28 (2012) (disagreeing with H. L. A. Hart’s view that each legal system has only one
rule of recognition). Kramer prefers not to consider those non-ultimate rules as rules of recognition.
MATTHEW H. KRAMER, H.L.A. HART: THE NATURE OF LAW 91–92 (2018).
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enough (e.g. a duty of public officials specifically not to engage in any
non-Article V constitutional change). However, if we see a change as
unlawful only if it is legally invalid, then violation of any legal duties is
irrelevant because legal powers can be effectively exercised while violating
legal duties (only legal disabilities block the effectiveness of legal
powers).61 The question would then be whether the Article V power
somehow contains limitations other than the requirement of following one
of the procedures it expressly provides (e.g. that it does not allow a
creation of a new constitution). I am skeptical of claims about such implicit
limitations. And if there is no such limitation, even a wholesale
constitutional replacement through Article V would count as a valid and
lawful exercise of an amendment power, and thus not an exercise of a
constituent power (on a view of constituent powers that requires
unlawfulness of constitutional change).
However, on any broader view of constituent powers, Albert can be
perfectly correct in saying: “The four procedures in Article V give political
actors the tools to exercise the full scope of powers to change the
Constitution . . . from outside the constitutional order, in order to found a
new constitution that leads to legally discontinuous constitutional
change.”62
Even if Article V really gives “the full scope of powers,”63 then there is
space for constituent power to be genuinely manifested when Article V is
properly used. Any such change could then be seen as both coming from
within the constitutional order and from outside (as an exercise of a
primary constituent power, which is more fundamental than the
constitutional order).
CONCLUSION
In several places in my discussion, instead of arguing for one definite
view, I limited myself to canvassing the options. I did so regarding (1) the
choice between de facto and de jure conceptions of constituent power, (2)
which normative framework to adopt for a de jure conception, and (3)
what kind of constitutional change (by definition) results from an exercise
of constituent power or constituent authority. The third issue is, I think,
also a question pertinent to the concept of constituent authority.
61
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 58–60 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923); Raz, supra note 26,
at 82; H. L. A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Powers, 81 YALE L.J. 799, 816 (1972); Eugenio Bulygin, On
Norms of Competence, 11 LAW & PHIL. 201, 205–06 (1992); Lindahl & Reidhav, supra note 53, at
163; Luís Duarte d’Almeida, Fundamental Legal Concepts: The Hohfeldian Framework, 11 PHIL.
COMPASS 554, 558–59 (2016).
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Albert, supra note 59, at 23.
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The first and the third choices call for a resolution according to
methodological, pragmatic considerations. In other words, to decide
between the various options we should ask the question: what is the
concept of constituent power (constituent authority) for? This means that
different understandings may be acceptable in different contexts (e.g. in
different research projects with different goals).
However, I want to stress that once someone adopts a de jure
conception of constituent power and aims to apply it to any real-life or
hypothetical scenario of constitutional change, then they will most likely
be unable to get away with bracketing out the complex first-order
normative (“what should be done?”) and meta-normative (“how to
understand, classify, etc. claims of what should be done?”) issues. Given
the significant role a concept like constituent power (or constituent
authority) may play in the political life of a community, it is, I think,
incumbent on scholars invoking that concept to grapple with questions
like: “is this (understanding of) constituent power really legitimate?” or
even more fundamentally “what does it mean for something like that to be
legitimate?”.

